

Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 STATE 006810

44

ORIGIN NODS-00

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY IO - JBAKER
APPROVED BY S - THE SECRETARY
NEA - AATHERTON
EUR -JARMITAGE (SUBS)
IO - SLEWIS
C - HSONNENFELDT (SUBS)
S/S:MR. ORTIZ
P - JSISCO (DRAFT)
S/S- ;R. ORTIZ

----- 061293

O 121617Z JAN 76 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION USUN NEW YORK IMMEDIATE
INFO AMEMBASSY MOSCOW IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T STATE 006810

NODIS

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, UN, UR

SUBJECT: CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON SECURITY
COUNCIL MIDDLE EAST DEBATE

FOR MOYNIHAN FROM SECRETARY

1. AS YOU KNOW, SOVIETS HAVE INDICATED THAT THEY WISH US
TO CONSULT WITH RESPECT TO THE CURRENT SECURITY COUNCIL
ROUND. IN LIGHT OF CURRENT STATE OF RELATIONS BETWEEN
OURSELVES AND THE SOVIETS, PARTICULARLY ANGOLAN DEVELOP-
MENTS, WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO PURSUE THIS
CONSULTATION IN AS A LOW-KEY FASHION AS POSSIBLE AND IN
THE NORMAL ROUND OF TALKS WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF SECURITY
COUNCIL DELIBERATIONS. WE BELIEVE UNOBTRUSIVE TALKS BY
SECRET

SECRET

PAGE 02 STATE 006810

BENNETT WITH HIS COUNTERPART WOULD BE IN ORDER AND UNLESS

YOU HAVE OTHER VIEWS, SUGGEST HE INFORM SMUN MONDAY THAT, IN RESPONSE TO THEIR SUGGESTION, HE IS PREPARED TO EXCHANGE VIEWS AT THEIR CONVENIENCE. THIS DOES NOT, OF COURSE, PRECLUDE YOU AND MALIK HAVING THE NORMAL EXCHANGES WHICH TAKE PLACE IN AND AROUND THE SECURITY COUNCIL CHAMBER.

2. WE BELIEVE THE FOLLOWING POINTS CAN USEFULLY BE MADE DURING INITIAL EXCHANGE WITH THE SOVIETS AFTER ELICITING THEIR VIEWS AS INITIATORS OF THE CONSULTATION:

----- (A) AS THEY KNOW FROM OUR BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS, WE CONTINUE TO BELIEVE THAT THE GENEVA CONFERENCE, WITH THE US AND USSR AS CO-CHAIRMEN, IS THE PRIME INSTRUMENTALITY THROUGH WHICH PRACTICAL PROGRESS TOWARDS A PEACE SETTLEMENT MUST BE MADE. WE DO NOT FAVOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL BECOMING THE PRIME INSTRUMENTALITY. FYI: WE DO NOT BELIEVE THE SOVIETS WOULD IN THE LONG RUN FAVOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL, PRIMARILY BECAUSE THE CHINESE WOULD HAVE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR AN ACTIVE ROLE. END FYI.

----- (B) AS SOVIETS KNOW, 242 AND 338 ARE THE BASES OF THE GENEVA FRAMEWORK. US AND THE USSR HAVE AGREED THAT THE QUESTION OF ADDITIONAL PARTICIPATION AT ANY GENEVA CONFERENCE IS A MATTER FOR THE ORIGINAL PARTICIPANTS TO DECIDE. IT IS, THEREFORE, A MATTER WHICH IS PROPERLY AND APPROPRIATELY A SUBJECT OF CONSULTATIONS AMONG THE GENEVA PARTICIPANTS AT A RENEWED GENEVA CONFERENCE OR AS WE HAVE SUGGESTED AT A PRIOR EXPLORATORY GET TOGETHER OF THIS GROUP OF STATES. FOR THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO ALTER AND UNDERMINE THE 242 AND 338 FRAMEWORK WOULD DIMINISH THE PROSPECTS FOR THE ACHIEVEMENT OF WHAT HAS BEEN A COMMON US AND SOVIET OBJECTIVE--AN EARLY RENEWAL OF THE GENEVA CONFERENCE.

3. WE WOULD BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT A RESOLUTION THAT SIMPLY REAFFIRMS 242 AND 338 AND CALLS FOR THE RENEWAL OF A GENEVA CONFERENCE OR PREPCOM AT WHICH ALL MATTERS, PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE, COULD BE DISCUSSED.

4. THIS WILL BE BASICALLY OUR POSTURE IN THE SECURITY COUNCIL

SECRET

PAGE 03 STATE 006810

COUNCIL AND WE WOULD APPRECIATE RECEIVING THE SPECIFIC VIEWS OF THE SOVIETS. YOU MIGHT ADD THAT WE DO NOT BELIEVE THAT IT IS IN EITHER THE SOVIET OR THE US INTEREST TO ALLOW THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL TO GET OUT OF HAND IN SUCH A WAY THAT FUTURE DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS ON THE MIDDLE EASTERN QUESTION COULD BE SERIOUSLY PREJUDICED. THIS IS AN AREA, AS THE SOVIETS KNOW, WHICH IS MUCH TOO CRITICAL AND FRAUGHT WITH DIFFI-

CULTIES FOR BOTH OF US TO PERMIT TENSIONS TO INCREASE
OR FUTURE NEGOTIATING OPPORTUNITIES TO BE DESTROYED. WE
WILL DO OUR BEST TO AVOID A COUNCIL SESSION WHICH CON-
TRIBUTES TO SUCH RESULTS AND EXPECT THE SOVIETS WILL
DO LIKEWISE. KISSINGER

SECRET

NNN

Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01 JAN 1994
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: DIPLOMATIC DISCUSSIONS, UNSC RESOLUTIONS, PEACE PLANS, NEGOTIATIONS, FOREIGN POLICY POSITION, CAT-C
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Draft Date: 12 JAN 1976
Decaption Date: 01 JAN 1960
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Authority: coburnhl
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 28 MAY 2004
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1976STATE006810
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: JBAKER
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Film Number: P840086-0266
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
ISecure: 1
Legacy Key: link1976/newtext/t19760165/aaaacgee.tel
Line Count: 120
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Office: ORIGIN NODS
Original Classification: SECRET
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Page Count: 3
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: NODIS
Reference: n/a
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Authority: coburnhl
Review Comment: n/a
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 05 MAY 2004
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review History: RELEASED <05 MAY 2004 by BoyleJA>; APPROVED <01 SEP 2004 by coburnhl>
Review Markings:

Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
04 MAY 2006

Review Media Identifier:
Review Referrals: n/a
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIETS ON SECURITY COUNCIL MIDDLE EAST DEBATE
TAGS: PFOR, PEPR, UR, US
To: USUN NEW YORK MOSCOW
Type: TE
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 04 MAY 2006